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Chapter 8
Intangible and Tangible
Retirement Incentives
John Keefe
A large number of colleges and universities have designed programs that
provide incentives for faculty to retire earlier than they might otherwise
choose. Other chapters in this volume offer surveys and case studies of re-
tirement plan features and behavior, including how they were developed as
well as statistics on faculty acceptance. This chapter takes a different tack
by examining the early retirement decision primarily from the employee’s
perspective—that is, how an individualmight weigh the choice between full-
time professorship and part-time work or full retirement. We find that in
designing retirement incentive programs, administrators and faculty should
place an equal emphasis on how the intangible aspects of retirement will
compare to the accomplishment and collegiality of teaching life.The impor-
tance of these intangibles varies from person to person and will likely be
different from institution to institution. Nonmonetary factors are difficult to
sort out, andmay requiremore flexible offerings than administrators are ac-
customed to making. Nevertheless, the lifestyle and self-esteem factors are
often as important to a plan’s success as are the cash incentives.
The process of identifying the relevant nonmonetary variables, and then
measuring the value or level of utility they provide to different individuals,
is problematic. Consider, for instance, differences in lifestyle preferences
and other factors expressed in national retirement statistics. Americans are
retiring, on average, at younger and younger ages. As Dora Costa points
out in her important work on the history of retirement, people no doubt
havemonetary justifications for retiring sooner, but,monetary factors being
equal, nonmonetary factors help explain why some people retire sooner
than others (Costa 1998).
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Intangible and Tangible Retirement Incentives 129
The Decision of the Early Retiree
One approach is to think about how a faculty member might evaluate his or
her own well being. Typical early retirement offers result in a mix of factors
that are both monetary (such as the value of a lump sum incentive payment
for early retirement, part-time salary, or ongoing health insurance) and non-
monetary (such as the rewards of pursuing hobbies or travel earlier than
would otherwise be the case). The retiree’s challenge is to weigh the pro-
spective value of the mix of the new options against the expected value of
full-time employment.
Predicting how an employee will react to an early retirement offer is com-
plicated. Individuals have different economic situations, lifestyle prefer-
ences, and views of the future. To an individual who has saved enough to
fund a comfortable retirement, the monetary options of early retirement—
or even a continuing salary from full-time employment—may have less in-
fluence on the retirement decision than the nonmonetary options. For a
person for whom working is a hardship, due perhaps to illness, the non-
monetary value of continuing to work full time may be relatively small, or
even negative. On the other hand, a person who has few interests outside
academia, or who has particularly strong attachments to the university, may
place a relatively low value on the nonmonetary aspects of retired life.
Not only will the estimate of the future value of an early retirement choice
vary across individuals, but also a given individual’s view of the decision to
retire earlymay change over time. Between the ages of 60 and 70, the relative
importance of salary, collegiality, and career achievement can vary substan-
tially. Moreover, there is great uncertainty surrounding the retirement deci-
sion. Most people can only guess at how well they will adapt to leaving their
institutions, whether they will enjoy the sudden abundance of free time, and
what standard of living their retirement income will provide over the long
run.
A Complete Example: Incentive Payment
To consider a hypothetical example, assume that a professor age 62 years
and who has planned to retire at 65, is offered a lump sum cash incentive to
retire early. How can she determine her ‘‘best’’ alternative?
By simplifying what is almost always a complex personal decision, we can
examine the question in a more rigorous way. The pertinent period of time
is only the three years subject to early retirement; our professor had planned
to retire at 65 anyway. Therefore, during the prospective early retirement
years of 62 to 64, how can the professor estimate the future value of con-
tinuing to work, versus taking the early retirement package?
Her first option is staying in her job full time for three more years, earn-
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130 John Keefe
Table 1. Retirement Versus Continued Work
Full-time work Retirement
Primary income Salary Lump-sum payment
Saving for retirement
Secondary income Consulting Consulting
Work life Teaching and research Postuniversity study
Nonwork life ‘‘Being a professor at the Time with spouse and family
university’’ Travel, hobbies, etc.
Community
Prestige
Source: See text.
ing the monetary value of salary and retirement contributions from the uni-
versity, plus any consulting or other nonteaching income, and enjoying the
personal satisfaction of teaching, research, and service to the faculty and
students. Her alternative is to accept the university’s early retirement offer
and retire immediately. In so doing she would collect the lump sum retire-
ment incentive and gain the nonmonetary value of increased leisure time.
However, she would forgo the salary to be earned until 65, and her pen-
sion account would be smaller, having missed three years of contributions
(a possible indirect effect is that consulting and other outside incomemight
drop off if she were no longer affiliated with her institution). She would also
give up the nonmoney benefits of teaching and research.Table 1 details the
monetary and nonmonetary options of this example.
A little more background is needed to evaluate such a decision. First, we
have to know the standing of the professor’s retirement account, to deter-
mine whether retirement is even a realistic choice. Can she retire at 62—
living on the lump sum plus savings until 65—and then have an adequate
income for the rest of her life? If not, her decision is straightforward. She
needs to keep working until 65, and perhaps beyond.
Let’s assume that the professor does have sufficient savings and retirement
funds. The relative values of factors she has to trade off are her salary ver-
sus the lump sum, and the value of work versus retirement. To express the
point more formally, we can hypothesize that the professor will accept early
retirement when the total estimated future value from early retirement in
the years 62 through 64 is greater than the value of being a full-time profes-
sor.We then decide by comparing the monetary and nonmonetary aspects
of working and retirement, as illustrated in Tables 2 and 3.
During the years of age 62 to 64, the professor would receive after-tax
payments worth $180,000 were she to continue working, and $75,000 were
she to accept the early retirement offer.The nonmonetary value of working
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Intangible and Tangible Retirement Incentives 131
Table 2. Value of Working Until 65
Monetary assumptions:
Three years salary $250,000 before taxes
$150,000 after taxes
Three years of institution’s retirement contributions $ 30,000 after taxes
Total monetary value $180,000 after taxes
Nonmonetary assumptions: value of teaching, scholarship,
service = 3W
Source: See text.
W = nonmonetary value of working.
Table 3. Value of Early Retirement, 62–64
Monetary assumptions:
Early retirement lump sum $80,000 before taxes
$50,000 after taxes
Medical insurance $25,000 after taxes
Total monetary value $75,000 after taxes
Nonmonetary Assumptions:
Value of retirement activities = 3R
Uncertainty of benefits of retirement = e
Source: See text.
R = nonmonetary value of retiring.
for one year is represented by W, and the nonmonetary value of retiring is
represented by R.
In addition to creating variables to represent the nonmonetary values of
work and retirement, we have introduced an uncertainty factor, e, to repre-
sent the uncertainty of the benefits of retirement. Although this uncertainty
cannot be quantified and varies from person to person, it is important to
recognize. Retirement is a decision a person makes only once, and the cost
of a bad choice is very high. The value of e is negative in many cases, but
because it is not quantifiable, we have assigned it a zero value and left the
variable in the expressions simply as a reminder of its importance.
Two additional monetary variables might be considered in the case of
early retirement. First, our professormight be able start drawing social secu-
rity payments at age 62, and thus receive an additional monetary benefit for
retirement in the years 62 through 64.We have ignored this income for the
sake of simplicity, but we note that in many cases it might be an important
cash flow to the early retiree, and thus tilt the analysis in favor of selecting
early retirement. Second, we have ignored the value of a retirement account
or other savings on which she might draw before age 65. In drawing down
a retirement account she would be better off by the amount of the income,
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132 John Keefe
but worse off by the amount of the reduced savings, so again for simplicity
we omit this from the analysis.
Should our professor accept the offer? The arithmetic says that she should
retire early if
3R + $75,000 + e > 3W + $180,000.
That is, the prospective retiree should accept this offer if the intangible
value of being retired for three years, 3R, discounted for uncertainty, e, is
worth $105,000 or more than the intangible value of continuing to work
for three years. Looking at the expression in terms of one year gives this
relationship:
Intangibles of Retirement = Intangibles of Work + $35,000.
Thus the structure of this offer puts a very high implicit cash value on
retiring. Our example professor should accept only under unusual circum-
stances. One case is where the value of retirement is especially high to her,
for instance, if an attractive job offer has happened to come along at the
same time as the early retirement offer. Similarly, she should accept if, for
some reason, the value of hobbies or travel in those three years is especially
high (in most cases, however, she would be able to hike the Appalachians or
collect snails at age 65, and come out ahead financially through continuing
to work). Another case where she should accept the early retirement offer is
where the value of work is especially low, or even negative. This offer might
prevail where the professor or her spouse is suffering an illness, or where
the professor has completely lost her taste for teaching.
The arithmetic tells us that to make the offer of early retirement as at-
tractive as continuing to work, the school’s lump sum payment has to make
up for (1) the lost salary and pension contribution in years 62 to 64; (2) the
difference, if any, between the intangibles of work and the intangibles of re-
tirement; and (3) the uncertainty of retiring three years early. (A professor
who thinks in plain English might express the offer this way: ‘‘They are ask-
ing me to give up the work I like and have done well for thirty years, and to
start a retirement I am not sure I am ready for. Maybe I’m better off working
for the three years and earning the extra $100,000.’’)
Adding a Phased Retirement Option
Wenowexamine the decision to accept or reject a ‘‘phased retirement’’ offer.
Instead of the lump sum incentive offer, let’s assume the same professor re-
ceives an offer where she would work half-time for the years 62 to 64 and
receive 50 percent of her salary. Pension contributions would be made on
the reduced salary, and she would retain health benefits at the same cost as
under full-time employment.
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Intangible and Tangible Retirement Incentives 133
Table 4. Phased Retirement Until 65
Monetary assumptions:
Three years salary $125,000 before taxes
$ 75,000 after taxes
Three years retirement contributions $ 15,000 after taxes
Total monetary value of phased retirement $ 90,000
Nonmonetary assumptions:
Value of teaching, scholarship and service = (3 × 0.5W) = 1.5W
Value of retirement activities = (3 × 0.5R) = 1.5R
Uncertainty of retiring = 0.5 × e
Source: See text.
R = nonmonetary value of retiring.
W = nonmonetary value of working.
In this case, our professor is enjoying a portion of the nonmonetary bene-
fits of both working and retired life, and she faces only part of the uncer-
tainty of retirement. (For the moment we have assumed that each factor is
reduced by half, but we will demonstrate later that the proportions of work,
salary and retirement are crucial to the analysis). Table 4 summarizes the
assumptions.
Under these assumptions the decision-making expression becomes:
1.5W + 1.5R + $90,000 + (0.5 × e) > 3W + $180,000.
That is, if the sum of the nonmonetary attributes of a half-working and half-
retired life, plus the $90,000 to be received from working part time, are
greater than the value of working plus salary, then our professor should ac-
cept phased retirement.Working through the arithmetic gives this result in
terms of one year’s worth of retirement:
intangibles of retirement = intangibles of work + $60,000.
Assuming these proportions, this offer is less attractive than the previous
lump sum example by the amount of the incentive payment. That is, to a
person who accepts this offer, the implicit cash value of retiring is $60,000
over the value of working. However, if the assumptions are altered so that
(1) the arrangement calls for 50 percent of full-time pay for 33 percent of
full-time teaching, and that (2) the balance between the intangible bene-
fits is changed—so that we assume that our professor manages to give up
less of the value of work and get more benefit from retirement—the decision
equation becomes:
2W + 2R + $120,000 + (0.5 × E) > 3W + $180,000.
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134 John Keefe
In terms of one year, this expression becomes:
intangibles of retirement > 0.5(intangibles of work) + 30,000.
Under the assumption that the phased retiree can keepmore of the bene-
fits of work (perhaps due to participation in a special senior faculty advisor
program, or other measures that place an emphasis on the contributions
of retiring professors) and at the same time add more of the benefits of re-
tirement (due to a lighter teaching load), the option of early retirement be-
comes more attractive. Accepting early retirement is twice as valuable in the
second phased example as in the first, and more than twice as valuable as
the incentive payment example.
Prospective Retiree ‘‘Types’’
We can categorize the decisionmakers according to their preferences—
grouping them into ‘‘types’’—and thus account for the consequent range of
decisions (Harsanyi 1967,1968). Four different types within the population
of prospective academic retireesmay be identified, according to individuals’
utility for the nonmonetary aspects of work life and retired life. Prospective
retirees who assign a high value (or low value) to teaching, research, school
service and collegiality are ranked ‘‘high W ’’ (or ‘‘low W ’’). Prospects who
place a high value (or low value) on travel, hobbies or time spent with family
are ranked ‘‘highR’’ (or ‘‘lowR’’). Other determinants of a potential retiree’s
R status, as noted earlier, would be his or her employment options outside
the university, or a personal or spouse health limitation that would make
working full-time less attractive.
Table 5 lays out the four types in this analysis. A person who is satisfied
with working full time and has little interest in travel or hobbies—at least
during the years 62 to 64, the time subject to consideration for early retire-
ment—would be ranked ‘‘highW, low R.’’ A professor with both a high level
of current job satisfaction and excellent work prospects outside the univer-
sity would be ranked ‘‘highW, high R.’’ As mentioned earlier, the shifting of
a person’s preferences over time could mean that an individual’s type could
change as well.
In general, prospective retirees with low W values would probably be at-
tracted to incentive payment plans, as they are giving up little job satisfac-
tion.Those with highW values, on the other hand, would likely want to keep
ahand in teaching or research, andmight thus bemore attracted to offers in-
volving part-time teaching assignments. People with high R values are more
likely to accept early retirement offers than those with low values.
Two analyses examining the early retirement offerings made to professors
in the University of California (UC) system have used a similar typology:
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Intangible and Tangible Retirement Incentives 135
Table 5. ‘‘Types’’ of Faculty by Nonmonetary Values
LowW HighW
Low R Low value to working High value to working
Low value to retirement Low value to retirement
High R Low value to working High value to retirement
High value to working High value to retirement
Source: See text.
W = the nonmonetary value of working.
Switkes (this volume) and Pencavel (1997). From personnel dossiers of fac-
ulty eligible for three waves of early retirement incentive offers, Pencavel
developed profiles on those likely to participate in UC’s early retirement
programs. He found that individuals who accepted the offers tended to be
older and earned lower salaries. Both Pencavel and Switkes indicate that the
UC plans hit their mark, by encouraging retirement by less productive fac-
ulty while not causing the more productive faculty to leave. In particular,
in one wave of offers, only 6 percent of faculty in their late 50s accepted,
versus nearly 60 percent of those in their late 60s.They also found that indi-
viduals turning down early retirement offers tended to earn much higher
salaries than those who accepted, suggesting that the more accomplished
and active scholars (the high W group) stayed while their less productive
colleagues (the lowW group) chose to retire. Last, faculty rejecting the early
retirement incentives were entitled to pensions averaging only 62 percent
of final salary, while those accepting were slated for a replacement rate of
75 percent. A higher replacement rate would reduce some of the financial
uncertainty surrounding retirement (the e term in the expressions above).
When an institution is designing an early retirement plan, identifying
types among the targeted faculty is crucial. Once the needs and preferences
of the targets are understood, administrators can then create incentives that
will encourage the redundant professors to leave or cut back, while reducing
the risk of adverse selection (that is, losing key senior faculty as a result of
offering the wrong incentives).
What Does All This Mean?
Our analysis suggests three conclusions thatmay be useful to administrators
in the real world:
• The size of incentive payments is not the most important variable in an
early retirement decision.
• The most important variables are the prospective retiree’s intangible re-
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136 John Keefe
wards from work and retirement. In most circumstances, these factors
are not under the administrator’s control.
• Early retirement is not an effective form of performance management.
Money by itself—at least, in amounts affordable to most institutions—will
likely have little impact on the early retirement decision. If a tenured pro-
fessor is unwilling to retire because he needs the money, then an institution
probably will have to pay the professor at least as much as his salary to leave.
If he has already provided for retirement, but cannot imagine a life without
teaching, the institution will be at a disadvantage in encouraging his retire-
ment if its only tool is a payment incentive.
While it is difficult to place dollar values on the intangibles of work, it
is clear from the low acceptance rates of most programs that faculty value
these as highly as cash. Thus if an institution can meaningfully enhance
the status of retired professors, design an appealing part-time program, or
otherwisemake retirement into a ‘‘win–win’’ situation for both the professor
and the institution, a greater acceptance rate may result.
Some institutions have undertaken unconventional strategies to encour-
age early retirement, with the goal of reducing the nonmonetary value
of professorship, including enforcing tenure review, appropriating office
space, and otherwise making life difficult for prospective retiree.We would
not recommend these approaches, however, as they are harsh for the em-
ployee and may send undesired signals to the next generation of senior fac-
ulty. Another option—one requiring a long-term view on the university’s
part—would be to carefully study professor demographics, share the infor-
mation and the university’s goals with the faculty, and encourage them to
contemplate retirement or part-time teaching well before any bottlenecks
occur.With a better understanding of the university’s reasons for the early
retirement transaction, and a clearer vision of the retired life five or ten years
in advance, academics would suffer less uncertainty and might possibly wel-
come early retirement offers.
Conclusion
In designing a retirement plan, administratorsmust place an equal emphasis
on how the intangible aspects of retirement will compare to the attractions
of teaching life. In developing retirement offers, administrators should take
into account what factors will appeal to different groups, or ‘‘types,’’ within
the population of prospective retirees. Nonmonetary factors are difficult to
sort out, and may require more flexible offerings than administrators are
accustomed to making, but the lifestyle and self-esteem factors are as im-
portant to a plan’s success as the cash incentives.
By their nature, however, these techniques have limitations, and they
must be developed and applied carefully. It is difficult for administrators to
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assess an objective value for the nonmonetary factors embedded in an offer,
or predict how employees will react to them. Nonetheless, the intangibles
are an important part of each person’s retirement decision, and should be
considered alongside retirement income and incentive payments.
Dr. Yaw Nyarko of New York University contributed to the game theory
analysis in this essay.
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